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Abstract. This paper presents and analyzes the estimators of the structural parameters, in
the Bühlmann-Straub model, involving complicated mathematical properties of conditional
expectations and of conditional covariances. So to enable to use the better linear credibility
results obtained in this model, we will provide useful estimators for the structure parameters.
From the practical point of view it is stated the attractive property of unbiasedness for these
estimators.
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0. Introduction
In this article we first present the Bühlmann-Straub model—see Section 1, which
consists of a portfolio of non-life insurance contracts. In Section 1 we will intro-
duce the assumptions of the Bühlmann-Straub model. In that section the optimal
linearized credibility premium is derived. It turns out that this procedure does not
provide us with a statistic computable from the observations, since the result involves
unknown parameters of the structure function. To obtain estimates for these struc-
ture parameters for the Bühlmann-Straub model, the contracts are embedded in a
collective of identical contracts, all providing independent information on the struc-
ture distribution. In Section 2 we provide some useful estimators for the structure
parameters. In that section we give unbiased estimators for the structure parameters,
such that if the structure parameters in the optimal linearized credibility premium
are replaced by these estimators, a homogeneous estimator results. This last estima-
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tor can also be shown to be optimal (see Section 3). In Section 3 we show that this
last estimator is in fact the optimal linearized homogeneous credibility estimator.
1. The Bühlmann-Straub model
For this model we look upon the portfolio as represented in Diagram 1. We
consider a portfolio which can be subdivided in groups consisting of contracts with
common risk parameter, as in Diagram 1.
Contracts 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j . . . . . . . . . . . . .k
Structure variables θj
Observable variables with p 1 Xj1(wj1)














Diagram 1. Bühlmann-Straub model
Each contract j = 1, . . . , k is the average of a group of wjr contracts, where wjr
is the weight (size) of the group j at time r, with r = 1, . . . , t. So the weight of a
“contract” may vary in time, if this weight is equal to the number of proper contracts
grouped into an average contract at time r, where r = 1, . . . , t (wjr = (# of contracts
considered having a common risk parameter θj), where r = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , k).
The model consists of the structural variables θj and the observable variables Xjr,
where j = 1, . . . , k and r = 1, . . . , t. So the contract j consists of the set of variables
(θj , X
′
j) = θj , Xjr , r = 1, . . . , t,
where j = 1, . . . , k; the contract indexed by j is a random vector consisting of a
random structure parameter θj and observations Xj1, Xj2, . . . , Xjt, see Diagram 1:
(θj , X
′
j) = (θj , Xj1, . . . , Xjt),
where j = 1, . . . , k. Of course theXjr variables represent the average of wjr contracts









jr , r = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , k.
The Bühlmann-Straub assumptions can be formulated as follows:
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(BS1): the contracts j = 1, . . . , k (the pairs, (θj , X
′
j) with j = 1, . . . , k) are in-
dependent; moreover, for every contract j = 1, . . . , k and for θj fixed, the variables
Xj1, . . . , Xjt are conditionally independent. The variables θ1, . . . , θk are identically
distributed. The observations Xjr , j = 1, . . . , k, r = 1, . . . , t have finite variance.
(BS2): E(Xjr |θj) = µ(θj), j = 1, . . . , k, r = 1, . . . , t (we assume that all contracts
have common expectation of the claim size as a function µ(·) of the risk parameter
θj , where j = 1, . . . , k).
Var(Xjr |θj) = σ
2(θj)/wjr , j = 1, . . . , k, r = 1, . . . , t, where all wjr > 0, with X
(i)
jr ,





(BS′1): for every j = 1, . . . , k and for θj fixed, the variables X
(i)
jr , i = 1, . . . , wjr ,
r = 1, . . . , t are conditionally independent and identically distributed. The variables
θ1, . . . , θk are identically distributed and the observations X
(i)
jr , i = 1, . . . , wjr , r =
1, . . . , t, j = 1, . . . , k have finite variance, and
(BS′2): E(X
(i)
jr |θj) = µ(θj), i = 1, . . . , wjr , r = 1, . . . , t, j = 1, . . . , k,
Var(X
(i)
jr |θj) = σ
2(θj), i = 1, . . . , wjr , r = 1, . . . , t, j = 1, . . . , k.
A consequence of the hypothesis (BS1):
Cov(Xjr, Xjq |θj) = 0, j = 1, k, r, q = 1, t, r < q.
R em a r k s. 1) µ(θj) is the pure net risk premium of the contract j, with j =
1, . . . , k.
2) The Bühlmann-Straub assumptions express the common characteristics of the
risk under consideration.
3) The weights arise when the contracts are replaced by averages of identical
contracts (with the same risk parameter), and the weight then represents the number
of such contracts.
The optimal linearized non-homogeneous credibility estimators are given in the
following theorem:
Theorem 1.1 (linearized non-homogeneous credibility estimator in the Bühl-
mann-Straub model). Under the hypotheses (BS1) and (BS2) of the Bühlmann-
Straub model, the following optimal linearized non-homogeneous credibility estima-
tor for µ(θj), for some fixed j, is obtained:
(1.1) Maj = µ̂(θj) = (1 − zj)m + zjMj ,
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(wjq/wj·)Xjq denotes the individual estimator for µ(θj) and
the resulting credibility factor for contract j is given by
zj = awj·/(awj· + s
2)
with a = Var[µ(θj)], s





j = 1, . . . , k.
This result can be found in [5]. To be able to use (1.1), one still has to estimate the
portfolio characteristicsm, s2, a. Some unbiased estimators are given in the following
section.
2. Parameter estimation
Here and in the following (see Section 3) we present the main results leaving the
detailed computations to the reader.
The estimators obtained in the previous section contain unknown structure pa-
rameters (the credibility premium for the Bühlmann-Straub model involves three
unknown parameters: m, s2 and a). So the expressions for these (pseudo-) estima-
tors are no longer statistics. But since the contracts are embedded in a collective
of identical contracts, all providing independent information on the structure dis-
tribution, it is possible to give unbiased estimators of these quantities, so we can
replace the unknown structure parameters by estimates. In this section, we consider
different contracts, each with the same structure parameters m, s2 and a, so that we
can estimate these quantities using the statistics of the different contracts. Some un-
biased estimators for the structure parameters m, s2 and a are given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (parameter estimation in the Bühlmann-Straub model). The esti-
mators






















































Xjw) are unbiased estimators of
the corresponding structure parameters, i.e.E(m̂) = m, E(ŝ2) = s2, E(â) = a.
P r o o f. The proof of E(m̂) = m is easy. Using the covariance relations (the
relevant covariance relations between the risk premium, the observations and the
weighted averages)—see Remark 2.1, we get
k(t − 1)E(ŝ2) =
∑
j,s












































































s2 = (kt − k)s2 = k(t − 1)s2.
So k(t − 1)E(ŝ2) = k(t − 1)s2, that is E(ŝ2) = s2.









































































































w2j· − (k − 1)s
2
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that is E(â) = a.
Theorem 2.1 is proved.
R em a r k 2.1. We start by deriving the relevant covariance relations between the
risk premium, the observations and the weighted averages appearing in Theorem 2.1.
Under the hypotheses (BS1)–(BS2) the following results can be obtained for the
conditional expectations and for the covariances:
Cov[µ(θj), Xiq] = δija,(2.1)
Cov(Xjq , Xir) = 0 for j 6= i,(2.2)






























The proof of these relations: for i = j we have
(2.8)
Cov[µ(θj), Xjq ] = E{Cov[µ(θj), Xjq|θj ]} + Cov{E[µ(θj)|θj ], E(Xjq |θj)}
= E[µ(θj)E(Xjq |θj)] − µ(θj)E(Xjq |θj)] + Cov[µ(θj), µ(θj)]
= E(0) + Var[µ(θj)] = a.
For i 6= j we have
(2.9)
Cov[µ(θj), Xiq ] = E{Cov[µ(θj), Xiq|θj ]} + Cov{E[µ(θj)|θj ], E(Xiq|θj)}
= E[µ(θj)E(Xiq|θj) − µ(θj)E(Xiq |θj)] + Cov[µ(θj), E(Xiq)]
= E(0) + Cov[µ(θj), m] = 0 + 0 = 0.
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Combining (2.8), (2.9), we obtain (2.1). If j 6= i, then we have
(2.10)
Cov(Xjq , Xir) = E[Cov(Xjq , Xir|θj)] + Cov[E(Xjq |θj), E(Xir |θj)]
= E[E(Xjq |θj)E(Xir|θj) − E(Xjq |θj)E(Xir |θj)] + Cov[µ(θj), E(Xir)]
= E(0) + Cov[µ(θj), m] = 0 + 0 = 0,
which implies (2.2). Let r, q = 1, . . . , t, r 6= q. We have
(2.11)
Cov(Xjq , Xjr) = E[Cov(Xjq , Xjr|θj)] + Cov[E(Xjq|θj), E(Xjr |θj)]
= E[E(Xjq |θj) · E(Xjr |θj) − E(Xjq |θj)E(Xjr |θj)] + Cov[µ(θj), µ(θj)]
= E(0) + Var[µ(θj)] = 0 + a = a.
Let r = q (= 1, . . . , t). We have












Consequently, from (2.11), (2.12) we get (2.3). According to (2.3) we have










































which implies our first assertion. According to (2.13) we have















































































































0 = 0, if r 6= j,
by virtue of the relation (2.2). From (2.15) one obtains our first assertion. According
to (2.15) we have





















From (2.17) one obtains our second assertion. According to (2.4) and (2.16) we have
(2.18)















































































































R em a r k 2.2. The estimator for a has the weakness that it may assume negative
values whereas a is non-negative. Therefore, we replace a by the estimator a∗ =
max(0, â), thus losing unbiasedness, but gaining admissibility. Also note that â in
Theorem 2.1 might well be negative. Since we want to estimate Var[µ(θj)], a more
sensible estimator might be max(0, â), but this is of course no longer an unbiased
estimator.
R em a r k 2.3. We want to remark that in the case one uses the formula
Maj = (1 − ẑj)M0 + ẑjMj
one has E(Maj ) 6= m, in the case the estimators from Theorem 2.1 are used, because
then ẑj is dependent of Mj and M0, j = 1, . . . , k. Of course, the attractive property
of unbiasedness is lost in this way, but we can still expect the resulting estimators
to be good. For instance, when an estimator is a maximum likelihood estimator for
a parameter.
R em a r k 2.4. Theorems 1.1 and 2.1 give the solution to the Bühlmann-Straub
model in the case of a non-homogeneous linear estimator for µ(θj) or, which amounts
to the same, for Xj,t+1, j = 1, . . . , k.
R em a r k 2.5. Note that in the credibility premium for a contract j, the credi-
bility factors zj also influence the estimator for the overall premium m used. We use
Xzw rather than Xww, though the latter would be considered more natural by many
practicing actuaries. It can be shown that Xzw has smaller variance than Xww. In
fact Xww has minimal variance in the classical statistical model, but in the credibil-
ity model at hand the situation is reversed. To prove that the credibility weighted
mean Xzw, based on the heterogeneity and the fluctuation of the risk, has minimal
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β2j Var(Xjw) + 2
∑
16j<j′6k





































Let j be fixed. Since Var(Xjw) = Cov(Xjw , Xjw) = a + s
2/wj· = a/zj by (2.4),

























βj − 1 = 0.
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To deal with the constraint (2.22), we add it to (2.20) with a Lagrange multiplier
−2α. Thus the problem (2.21) results. Taking the derivatives with respect to βj ,









, j = 1, . . . , k,
where α still has to be determined in such a way that (2.22) holds, too. Summing
















, j = 1, . . . , k.








































R em a r k 2.6. One could use another unbiased estimator for the structural pa-
rameter a, which really is only a pseudo-estimator, since its definition includes the
parameter a to be estimated.
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is an unbiased estimator of the heterogeneity parameter a.
P r o o f. Remembering that Mj = Xjw and M0 = Xzw, so E(Mj) = E(M0),
one gets using the covariance relations (2.4), (2.5):




















zj Var(Mj − M0) =
∑
j








zj[Cov(Xjw , Xjw) − Cov(Xjw , Xzw) − Cov(Xzw, Xjw)






























































z· = ak − a = (k − 1)a.
So (k − 1)E(â) = (k − 1)a, that is E(â) = a. Theorem 2.2 is proved.
R em a r k 2.7. The reason to consider this estimator â is that, together with ŝ2 as
in Theorem 2.1, it provides a nice interpretation of the degree of heterogeneity. It also
provides insight into a general procedure of extending these results, to the hierarchical
models. First, ŝ2 measures the fluctuation of the risk or the heterogeneity s2 in time,
see the definition of s2. Since s2 = E[σ2(θj)], the part of the variance describing
this fluctuation is measured by the squared differences (Xjs −Xjw)
2, corrected with
their natural weights wjs : wjs(Xjs −Xjw)
2. In total there are k times t results, but
k expectations are estimated from the individual data. This gives us an unbiased
estimator for the part of the variance describing heterogeneity of the individual risks
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(see ŝ2). Secondly, â measures the degree of heterogeneity between the contracts.
The square of the difference (Mj − M0)
2 between the individual weighted average
result Mj and the collective estimator M0 (weighted by credibility weights) is the
relevant quantity for performing the evaluation of the heterogeneity of the contracts.









The division by (k − 1) is due to the fact that we consider k contracts. The overall
average is calculated by means of the individual results, so the number of independent
terms equals (k − 1).
R em a r k 2.8. In case m in (1.1) is estimated by M0, we obtain a homogeneous
linear combination of all observable variables, giving an unbiased estimate ofm. This
last estimator can also be shown to be optimal (see Section 3). The next section shows
that this happens to give the optimal unbiased homogeneous linearized credibility
result.
3. The solution to the Bühlmann-Straub model in the case of
homogeneous credibility estimators
Replacing the structure parameter m by an unbiased estimate results in a homo-
geneous credibility estimator. In Section 3, we will show that this last estimator is
in fact the optimal linearized homogeneous credibility estimator. Now, we derive the
optimal linearized homogeneous credibility estimator.
Theorem 3.1 (homogeneous credibility estimators in the Bühlmann-Straub




















(3.3) Maj = (1 − zj)M0 + zjMj
with zj as in Theorem 1.1, where cj = (cjir)i,r.
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P r o o f. Let j be fixed. The unbiasedness restriction (3.2) can be written as
∑
i,r
cjir = 1, because E(Xir) = E[µ(θj)] = m.
We insert it in the expectation in (3.1) and add it to the function to be optimized



















Since (3.4) is the minimum of a positive definite quadratic form, it suffices to find a
solution with all partial derivatives equal to zero. Taking the derivative with respect
to cji′r′ gives for i
′ = 1, . . . , k, r′ = 1, . . . , t:




Using the expressions (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) of these covariances in terms of a and s2,
one obtains the following system of equations:





′ = 1, . . . , k, r′ = 1, . . . , t.












cji′r Cov(Xi′r, Xi′r′) +
∑
i;i6=i′

















′ = 1, . . . , k, r′ = 1, . . . , t.
These equations can be simplified as follows:
(3.7) α + δi′ja = acji′· + s
2cji′r′/wi′r′ , i


















= acji′· + s
2cji′r′/wi′r′ .
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Multiplying each equation by wi′r′ and summing these equations over the index r
′,
gives for each i′
(α + δi′ja)wi′· = cji′·awi′· + s
2cji′·.
So
(3.8) cji′· = (α + δi′ja)wi′·/(s
2 + awi′·).
Inserting (3.8) into (3.7) gives an expression for cji′r′ :
cji′r′ = (α + δi′ja)[1 − awi′·/(awi′· + s
2)]wi′r′/s
2 = (α + δi′ja)(1 − zi′)wi′r′/s
2.







[(α + δi′ja)(1 − zi′)wi′r′/s
2]Xi′r′ ,
where α still has to be determined in such a way that (3.2) holds, too. Summing all































+ zj = αz./a + zj
and the resulting value for α = a(1 − zj)/z., inserted in (3.9), gives after some
algebraic manipulations the following optimal estimator for µ(θj):
(3.9) Maj = µ̂(θj) = (1 − zj)Xzw + zjXjw
So the theorem is proved.
R em a r k 3.1. One likely choice in the minimization problem
Min
g(·)
E{[µ(θj) − g(Xj1, . . . , Xjt)]
2},
giving easily computable premiums, is








leading to the so-called linearized credibility results.
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Another possibility is to limit oneself to unbiased homogeneous linear estimators,




Proceeding in this way one gets homogeneous linear credibility formulae. By the
requirement of unbiasedness the sum of the credibility premiums equals the global
premium on the top-level.
R em a r k 3.2. In this section we demonstrated that the estimators obtained for
the pure net risk premium on contract level are the best linearized homogeneous
credibility estimators for the Bühlmann-Straub model.
Conclusions
This paper completes the solution of the Bühlmann-Straub model in the case of
a non-homogeneous linear estimator for µ(θj), or, which is equivalent, for Xj,t+1,
j = 1, . . . , k.
In view of assumption (BS1) about the independence of the contracts, it might
come as a surprise that the premium for a contract j involves results from other
contracts.
A closer look at this assumption reveals that this is so because the other contracts
provide additional information on the structure distribution.
For this reason the claim figures of other contracts cannot be ignored when esti-
mating the parameters appearing in the credibility estimate for the contract j.
In this article, the classical Bühlmann model is refined by associating the so-called
natural weights with the contracts. These weights arise when the contracts are
replaced by averages of identical contracts (with the same risk parameter), and the
weight then represents the number of such contracts.
But since the contracts are embedded in a collective of identical contracts, all
providing independent information on the structure distribution, we can estimate
these structural parameters in the Bühlmann-Straub model using the statistics of
the individual contracts.
The above two theorems 1.1 and 2.1 show that it is possible to give unbiased
estimators of these quantities (the portfolio characteristics) if we have more than
one observation available on the risk parameter.
The article contains a description of the Bühlmann-Straub model, behind a het-
erogenous portfolio, involving an underlying risk parameter for the individual risks.
Since these risks can now no longer be assumed to be independent, mathematical
properties of conditional covariances become useful.
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This paper is devoted to the Bühlmann-Straub model allowing the contracts to
have different weights (volumes) and the purpose of this article is to get unbiased
estimators for the portfolio characteristics.
The mathematical theory provides the means to calculate useful estimators for the
structure parameters.
From the practical point of view the property of unbiasedness of these estimators
is very appealing and very attractive.
The fact that it is based on complicated mathematics, involving conditional ex-
pectations and conditional covariances, need not bother the user more than it does
when he applies statistical tools like discriminant analysis, scoring models, SAS and
GLIM.
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